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COMMENTARY
Thomas Lee Hazen*
This symposium issue includes a number of interesting and provocative
articles. Professor Karmel explores the basis for the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's power to regulate substantive shareholder voting
rights. Commissioner Cox and Mr. Michael discuss the internationalization
of the securities markets. Professor Carney questions the legitimacy of the
SEC's increased emphasis on the enforcement of insider trading sanctions.
Finally, Professor Lipton describes the scope of federal regulation of broker-
dealers. The essay that follows provides a commentary on each of these
articles.
I. KARMEL ON DUAL CLASS CAPITALIZATION AND DISPARATE
VOTING RIGHTS
The federal securities laws are aimed primarily at full disclosure.' Corpo-
rate chartering laws, which are enacted in every state, apply to internal cor-
porate affairs and corporate governance generally. While the focus of the
federal law is on investor protection, state corporate laws approach share-
holder protection from the vantage point of the shareholders' proprietary
interests.2 Over the course of its history, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC or the Commission) has made various inroads into the field of
corporate governance.3 The most prominent SEC involvement in corporate
governance is through the proxy regulation of publicly traded companies.4
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; B.A. 1969; J.D. 1972,
Columbia University.
1. See, e.g., H. CHERRINGTON, THE INVESTOR AND THE SECURITIES ACT (1942); 1 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 121-29 (2d ed. 1961); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act
of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
2. See Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage,
Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wisc. L. REV. 391.
3. See, e.g., Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law. Part Way or All the Way?, 31
Bus. LAW. 991 (1976). The increasing concern over defensive tactics to takeovers may spark a
renewed interest in a federal corporation law. See Karmel, Will Takeover Abuses Lead to
Federal Corporation Law?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982); see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR COR-
PORATE CONTROL (2d ed. 1968); T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 11.1-
11.9 (1985 & 1987 Supp.); 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 857-1036.
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Due to the dichotomy between the relative roles of federal securities law and
state corporate law, each SEC foray into corporate governance raises ques-
tions as to whether a proper balance is being maintained. In the 1970's, the
focus of the SEC was on shareholder access to the proxy machinery5 and the
activities of corporate directors. 6 In the 1980's, the Commission's attention
has turned to the takover arena generally and, in particular, to various man-
agement responses to anticipated and pending takeover attempts. Professor
Karmel examines a very important aspect of this development: the regula-
tion of shareholder voting rights in the context of dual class voting shares.7
Professor Karmel presents a thorough examination of the SEC's role and
concludes that although the SEC has the power to regulate substantive vot-
ing rights, it should do so cautiously and reluctantly.
A major issue in recent years has been the ability of the management of
public corporations to authorize a class of shares with weighted voting
rights. Establishing a class of shares with superior voting rights has evolved
as an increasingly popular defensive response to hostile takeover attempts.
For most of its history, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has prohib-
ited the listing of shares where the issuer has a class of shares with disparate
voting rights.' Although the American Stock Exchange permits disparate
voting rights within limits, it prohibits nonvoting common stock.9 The Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) has no regulation of dispa-
rate voting rights at the present time, but it has proposed adoption of a one-
share/one-vote rule. 1o
A number of companies have authorized stock in violation of the NYSE
rule which led to a moratorium on its enforcement.'" After considering the
5. See Black, Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance, 5 SEC. REG. L.J. 291
(1978); Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J.
635 (1977).
6. See generally Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Man-
agement Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 555 (1981).
7. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting
Rights, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 809 (1987).
8. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 312.00, 313.00 (1984).
9. American Stock Exchange Listing Standards, Policies and Requirements § 122, 1 Am.
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 10,022 (1985).
10. See NASD Proposes Voting Rights Rule for all Major Equity Stock Markets, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 399 (Mar. 20, 1987). It is interesting to note that a commissioned
study by Professor Fischel concluded that the NASD should not require voting stock. See
Karmel, supra note 7, at 820 n.76. However, the NASD is proposing listing requirements that
would affect corporate governance such as a requirement for independent directors. Id. at 821.
The current proposals are frought with controversy; see, e.g., Exchange Talks on One Share,
One Vote Begin; Investors Slam NASD Plan, SEC. WEEK, Mar. 30, 1987, at 5.
11. See NYSE Initial Report of the Subcomm. on Shareholder Participation and Qualita-
tive Listing Standards, "Dual Class Capitalization" (Jan. 3, 1985).
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rule, the NYSE proposed a reversal of its long-time position by permitting
dual class capitalization, at least when approved by independent directors
and the shareholders. 2 It seems ironic that the NYSE is moving away from
its voting rights rule while the NASD has been moving toward adoption of
such a rule. Because of the SEC's oversight responsibility with regard to
self-regulatory organizations such as the NYSE and NASD, 3 any such rule
change must be approved by the SEC. The developments ushered in by
management entrenchment tactics and the NYSE's proposed changes have
spurred discussion as to the scope of the SEC's power to regulate substantive
shareholder voting rights.
There has been considerable controversy with regard to the propriety of
SEC regulation of shareholder voting rights that traditionally fall within the
domain of state corporate law. 4 As Professor Karmel points out, the pri-
mary thrust of the federal securities laws is disclosure, as opposed to regula-
tion, of normative corporate behavior and governance patterns.' 5 While the
SEC's mission is to protect the shareholders' interest as investors, the role of
protecting the shareholders' proprietary interest in the corporation has been
a matter of state law, 16 notwithstanding numerous suggestions to federalize
corporate law.' 7 On the other hand, section 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193418 regulates the proxy machinery of publicly traded companies.
As Professor Karmel notes, this section evidences a strong congressional rec-
ognition that shareholder suffrage plays an important role in investor protec-
tion.' 9 Furthermore, the proxy related disclosure obligations arguably are
12. See NYSE "Reluctantly" Adopts Dual Share Classification; SEC Approval Needed, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 998 (July 11, 1986).
13. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1982); see T. HAZEN, supra note 4,
§ 10.2.
14. See, e.g., Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 725 (1986); cf Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical
Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. I (1970) (suggesting
that major shareholders be granted only limited voting rights); Compare Seligman, Equal Pro-
tection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986) (arguing in favor of the Commission's authority) and Karmel, The
SEC's Power to Regulate Shareholder Voting Rights, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1 with
D. FISCHEL, ORGANIZED EXCHANGES AND THE REGULATION OF DUAL CLASS COMMON
STOCK (1986) (arguing against the efficacy of one share/one vote in maximizing shareholders'
interests).
15. Karmel, supra note 7, at 811.
16. See Hazen, supra note 2.
17. See, e.g., Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARV. L. REV.
396 (1936); Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101
(1974); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71
(1972).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
19. Karmel, supra note 7, at 824.
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based on the premise that shareholders of publicly traded companies have
significant voting rights.2° Professor Karmel carefully reviews both the his-
tory and text of the federal securities laws and concludes that the SEC has
"significant substantive power to regulate the relationship between the man-
agements of public corporations and their shareholders."2 She further
traces the SEC's pattern of involvement in corporate governance and con-
cludes that although the Commission has the authority to regulate share-
holder voting rights, it should proceed "cautiously and formulate a ...
policy with extreme reluctance."22
In addition to the federal proxy regulation, which is focused on disclosure
and thus does not address directly the treatment of substantive voting rights,
section 19(c) of the Securities Exchange Act provides the SEC with residual
power to promulgate rules it "deems necessary or appropriate to insure the
fair administration of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to
requirements of this chapter ... in furtherance of the purposes of this chap-
ter . . "23 It has been argued, although not without controversy, 24 that
section 19(c) supports the Commission's power to mandate self regulatory
organization rules relating to voting rights.25 Professor Karmel further sup-
ports this position by iterating to the history of self-regulatory involvement
in assuring shareholder suffrage.26
We are currently operating in an environment that has been skewed by the
market for corporate control. Takeover activity, both real and rumored, has
helped fuel an unknown degree of volatility in the markets. While takeover
speculation creates significant upward pressure on stock prices, management
entrenchment tactics,27 including but not limited to the creation of disparate
voting rights, can push prices in the opposite direction with equal force.2"
20. Id.
21. Id. at 814.
22. Id. at 831.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
24. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 14, at 726-27.
25. See Karmel, supra note 7, at 829; Seligman, supra note 14, at 714-19.
26. Karmel, supra note 7, at 829.
27. Stock Prices are Decreased by Poison Pills in Some Cases, SEC Staff Says, 18 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 348 (Mar. 14, 1986). But see Study Shows Fair Price Amendments Have
Little Effect on Stock Value, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1829 (Oct. 18, 1985).
28. The issuance of high voting stock is just one of many defensive tactics used by man-
agements to entrench themselves when faced with an anticipated, threatened, or pending take-
over attempt. Other tactics include the use of fair price amendments, poison pills, golden
parachutes, greenmail, and charter provisions calling for high voting thresholds for hostile
mergers. See generally A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLAN-
NING (2d ed. 1983 & 1985 Supp.); T. HAZEN, supra note 4, § 11.20; R. WINTER, M. STUMPF
& G. HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
PRACTITIONER (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
[Vol. 36:987
Commentary
While one group of academics maintains that the SEC should adopt a
hands-off policy and let the market control,29 public sentiment appears to be
to the contrary. It has been argued persuasively that the regulation of man-
agement entrenchment tactics should be left to state law in its definition of
management duties of care and loyalty. However, the SEC3" proposed fed-
eral legislation,a" as well as a number of commentators, 2 recognize that the
climate surrounding the market for control of the country's public corpora-
tions is an issue of national significance deserving uniform attention at the
federal level. Although, as Professor Karmel notes, the SEC should proceed
with caution and reluctance before imposing substantive regulation on vot-
ing rights, the failure of the self regulatory organizations to take appropriate
corrective action should provide an impetus to the SEC to prevent public
corporations from entrenching existing management at the expense of disen-
franchising shareholders.
II. Cox AND MICHAEL ON INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE
SECURITIES MARKETS
Commissioner Cox and Mr. Michael examine the development of interna-
tional trading markets for securities and commodity futures that have taken
place over the past several years a. 3  There are two basic types of linkages
that have been used to tie together markets in different nations. One method
is to provide for a linkage that allows participants in one market to commu-
nicate with their counterparts in another market.34 This can involve both
the automatic routing of orders to the most favorable market, and the auto-
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and
Directors'Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1985); Warden, The Boardroom as
a War Room: The Real World Applications of the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty, 40
Bus. LAW. 1431 (1985).
29. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE
L.J. 13 (1985) (arguing that greenmail is beneficial for the market); Note, Greenmail: Targeted
Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045
(1985); cf Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i) (1987) (prohibiting exclusionary self-tender offers).
31. See, e.g., Congress Responds to Hostile Tender Offers, 6 Bus. LAW. UPDATE, Sept./
Oct. 1985, at 1; see also IRC §§ 280G(b)-(c), 4999 (1986) (imposing excise tax on receipt of
golden parachutes and making them nondeductible to the paying corporation).
32. See, e.g., Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law-A Proposal for a National Policy Concerning
Tender Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 303 (1986); Note, Controlling Imprudent Lock-
Ups: The Necessity for Federal Legislation, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 91 (1985).
33. Cox & Michael, The Market for Markets. Development of International Securities and
Commodities Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 833 (1987).
34. See id. at 836.
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matic execution of all such transactions. The Intermarket Trading System
(ITS) was the first of such systems and has been implemented pursuant to
SEC approval.35 The ITS was viewed as a prototype for trading links and,
as approved by the SEC, was premised on automatic routing of orders while
retaining broker discretion by not providing for automatic transaction
execution.
The ITS is described as primitive since it links brokers and dealers with
one another rather than providing a link directly between the markets as is
the case with the three securities trading links currently existing between
various exchanges.16 These links are regulated through a system of market
surveillance and oversight much like the system governing domestic mar-
kets. The other type of linkage simply involves the sharing of information
about quotations and trades taking place on each of the participating mar-
kets. The one current example of such a link is that between the Interna-
tional Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the National Association
of Securities Dealers' Automated Quotation System.
37
According to the evidence analyzed by Commissioner Cox and Mr.
Michael, the international trading linkages that currently exist cannot be
economically justified in light of the contemporary market environment.
The authors maintain that there is insufficient use of the linkages between
the markets of different nations to make them cost-effective at present trad-
ing levels. Furthermore, based on the level of current usage, there is no
indication that linking international markets will increase market efficiency.
What then, is the basis for the current move toward internationalization? It
appears that the markets are preparing for the needs of the future when
projected increases in international transactions will make the trading links
and information links between markets more cost-effective.
After analyzing the economic basis for internationalization, Commis-
sioner Cox and Mr. Michael examine the type of regulation that is appropri-
ate. Some commentators have suggested that regulation of international
trading will hamper market efficiency.3a However, Commissioner Cox and
Mr. Michael disagree, asserting that some degree of regulation is necessary.
They conclude that "[i]f there is to be any expansion or modification of trad-
ing or operations on linked exchange markets, there must be a base of effec-
35. See Exchange Act Release No. 19,456, 48 Fed. Reg. 4938 (Feb. 3, 1983); see, e.g.,
Exchange Act Release No. 21,958 (April 18, 1985).
36. See Cox & Michael, supra note 33, at 847-48. In addition, there is a link between
commodities markets. See id. at 853-55.
37. Id. at 840.
38. See id. at 859-60 n.164 (citation of authorities).
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tive surveillance and oversight."3 9 Although surveillance of international
markets does provide additional costs to the maintenance of international
markets, the costs seem justified. As the authors ably point out, interna-
tional links fail their purpose if they do not operate smoothly. Surveillance
and oversight assures the smooth operation of the markets and thus is a cost
that is justified by the ensuing integrity and efficiency of the marketplace.
III. CARNEY ON INSIDER TRADING
In his thought provoking article on insider trading, Professor Carney pro-
poses that the increased emphasis on the regulation of insider trading is not
warranted.' Professor Carney concludes that little harm can be demon-
strated, in general, to either investors or to markets.4" Professor Carney
bases his thesis on the efficient capital market hypothesis and those studies
tending to support the hypothesis. The article points to empirical evidence
to support the conclusion that insider trading does not lure outsiders into the
market. Professor Carney further relies on economic writings that tend to
show that insider trading does not significantly affect the market price of
stocks.
Based on this evidence, Professor Carney concludes that the absence of a
causal connection between insider trading and the inducement of outsider
trading precludes a justifiable basis for finding an injury to investors result-
ing from the profit of insiders who trade on material nonpublic information.
Professor Carney further suggests that the absence of any evidence of inves-
tor injury means that even the SEC has little if any justifiable basis for regu-
lating insider trading. In fact, he indicates that the Commission's
motivation for aggressive insider trading enforcement is "bureaucratic
budget maximization"4 2 in an attempt to take advantage of the projected
congressional hearings.
It is undeniable that a direct causal connection cannot be shown between
insider trading and investor injury in the context of open market transac-
tions. This realization has led some courts to hold that rule lOb-5 cannot
support an implied remedy for investors against insider trading in the open
market.43 However, as Professor Carney acknowledges, the courts have not
taken what he views as the next logical step. The courts have refused to hold
that rule lOb-5 cannot support either SEC enforcement action or criminal
39. Id. at 860.
40. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 863 (1987).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 898.
43. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977);
cf Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
19871
Catholic University Law Review
prosecution."
After concluding that investor injury cannot support prohibitions against
insiders trading on nonpublic information, Professor Carney examines alter-
native rationales for regulating trading by insiders. The primary alternative
to the investor injury explanation is the misappropriation theory of insider
trading. Under this theory it is reasoned that an insider, or anyone else ow-
ing a fiduciary duty to the proprietor of the information, who takes informa-
tion belonging to someone else and reaps a profit thereby, must disgorge that
profit. The misappropriation theory of lOb-5 liability for insider trading has
had a growing acceptance in the federal courts, at least within the context of
SEC enforcement actions and criminal prosecutions.45 The misappropria-
tion basis for disgorgement has a sound footing in the common law46 and the
Supreme Court will soon be addressing its applicability under federal law.4 7
It is legion in the law of restitution that proof of actual injury is not neces-
sary to sustain an action for misappropriation by an agent or fiduciary.48
Notwithstanding the firm footing the misappropriation theory has in com-
mon law,49 one court has repudiated it50 and another has limited it for pro-
cedural reasons.51 Without necessarily rejecting the state law basis for
misappropriation of confidential information, Professor Carney questions
the SEC's role in "protecting the property rights of investment bankers in
confidential information received from issuers." 52 It is highly doubtful that
the SEC, or anyone else for that matter, would advance such a rationale in
support of vigorous governmental enforcement of the insider trading
44. Carney, supra note 40, at 876.
45. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 853
(1983); cf Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (acknowledging that misappropriation may be a
valid theory with regard to insiders and those standing in a fiduciary relation); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
46. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); 3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 505.1 (2d ed. 1939); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 190 com-
ment a (1937); see also Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common Law, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 845 (1982).
47. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 comment c (1957); see e.g., Annotation,
Employer's Right to Earnings or Profits Made by Employee, 13 A.L.R. 905, 907 (1921).
49. See supra note 46.
50. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
51. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (dismissing insider trading suit since
actual injury to corporation is a precondition of bringing a successful shareholder derivative
action).
52. Carney, supra note 40, at 897.
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prohibitions.53 The proprietary interest of investment banking firms in the
information is the basis for creating a fiduciary duty the breach of which has
significant adverse impact on the market's integrity.
However, a far more prevalent justification for insider trading regulation
is the inherent unfairness that results from permitting insiders to take unlim-
ited personal advantage of nonpublic information.54 Professor Carney dis-
misses as "anecdotal" 55 these claims that informational advantage of
insiders creates unfairness and undermines investor confidence as well as the
integrity of the marketplace. But what about a sense of morality and fair
play? Taking Professor Carney's view to an extreme, murder can be viewed
as an efficient way to rid society of poverty and unemployment, as was por-
trayed by Johnathan Swift in his Modest Proposal.56 There is certainly a
significant difference in degree between the immorality of taking another's
life, for example, and that of reaping personal profits from nonpublic infor-
mation gathered while in a fiduciary relationship to another. The point re-
mains, however, that arguments of market efficiency and absence of
demonstrable harm to investors or the marketplace57 do not address issues
of fairness.
The views set forth by Professor Carney have been with us for quite a
while58 and appear to be gathering support, at least among some academ-
ics.59 However, there has also been substantial criticism of the view that
insider trading should not be regulated.' Furthermore, the prevailing regu-
latory and judicial view is that insiders take undue advantage of their posi-
tions when they profit personally from material nonpublic information.6
53. Professor Carney also suggests that the SEC may have a hidden agenda of trying to
beef up its budget appropriations. See id. at 897-98.
54. See, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to
Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967).
55. Carney, supra note 40, at 878.
56. See generally J. SwiFr, A MODEST PROPOSAL (C. Beaumont ed. 1969).
57. While Professor Carney argues that no such harm exists, he apparently concedes that
there nevertheless is harm to the proprietor of the confidential information. Carney, supra
note 40, at 873-74.
58. See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
59. See generally Carney, supra note 40.
60. See, e.g., Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 DUKE L.J. 628 [hereinafter Cox, Critical Response]; Cox, Insider Trading Regu-
lation and the Production of Information: Theory and Evidence, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 475 (1986).
Professor Cox effectively questions the four arguments generally advanced in support of the
abolition of the restrictions on insider trading: (1) "The 'It's An Empirical Question' Argu-
ment;" (2) "The Efficient Stock Price Change Argument;" (3) "The Incentive Compensation
Argument;" and (4) "The Licensing Through Contracting Argument." Cox, Critical Response
supra at 642-59.
61. See T. HAZEN, supra note 4, § 13.9.
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Although there is considerable debate as to whether rule lOb-5 is the appro-
priate vehicle for regulation,62 there is a very strong move afoot from many
constituencies to tighten up the insider trading prohibitions.63
IV. LIPTON ON BROKER-DEALER REGULATION
Professor Lipton describes the scope of federal regulation of securities bro-
kers and dealers. 6' While broker-dealer regulation has always played an im-
portant role within the overall context of the securities laws, developments
in the nature of the markets foreshadow increased emphasis in this area.
The continued increase in the daily trading volume in the securities mar-
kets takes its toll on the ability of brokerage firms to cope with their day-to-
day business. The broker-dealer regulation that Professor Lipton describes
is thus likely to have its limits tested over the next several years. The
proliferation of the options and financial futures markets has added to the
typical broker-dealer repertoire and raised new questions concerning the
suitability obligations of the broker-dealer.65 In addition, wide swings in the
volatility of market prices increase the likelihood that customers will feel
that they have been led into the wrong investments by their brokers. It is
likely that we will continue to witness an increase in broker-dealer fraud
litigation.
Other important broker-dealer developments that are likely to be seen in
the future focus on the continued struggle concerning the appropriate role of
commercial banks in the stock brokerage and investment banking indus-
tries.66 Last year Congress adopted the Government Securities Act of
1986.67 It will be interesting to follow the degree to which the SEC will get
involved in the regulation of government securities dealers, and whether that
regulation will more closely follow the pattern of municipal securities dealers
or of securities dealers generally.68
62. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986); see e.g., Anders, Cloudy Cases: Insider-Trading Law Leads to an Array of Interpreta-
tions, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1987, at 31, col. 4.
63. See, e.g., April Key Month for Insider Trading, Takeover Hearings, SEC. WEEK, Mar.
30, 1987, at 4; Latest Proxmire Letter to Shad Focuses on Profits of Risk Arbitrage Firms, SEC.
WEEK, Feb. 23, 1987, at 3; A Get-Tough Mood on Insider Trading, Bus. WEEK, May 28, 1984,
at 16 (Business Week/Harris Executive poll).
64. Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 899 (1987).
65. See, e.g., T. HAZEN, supra note 4, § 10.7.
66. See generally Lipton, supra note 64, at 971-84.
67. Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-5). The new legislation became effective on July 25, 1987.
68. The SEC has adopted its proposed rules for government securities dealer regulation.
See Adoption of Rules Implementing Government Securities Act of 1986, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 24,372, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,120 (1987-1988
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For all of the foregoing reasons, Professor Lipton's description of broker-
dealer regulation highlights an important part of federal securities regula-
tion. The importance of this regulation is frequently underestimated.
Transfer Binder) (Apr. 12, 1987); SEC Clears Government Securities Regulations: Registration
Deadline Looms, SEC. WEEK, Feb. 23, 1987, at 5.
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